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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Faron Raymond Hawkins appeals from the amended judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of two counts of robbery.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The relevant facts and proceedings were partially set forth by the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 305 P.3d 513 (2013), as
follows:
In January 2008, a jury convicted Faron Hawkins of two
counts of robbery. He appealed his conviction and the Idaho Court
of Appeals issued a decision on December 30, 2009, vacating the
conviction and remanding the matter for a new trial. The Court of
Appeals determined that the district court erred by not having
Hawkins undergo a mental health evaluation during his jury trial to
determine whether or not he was competent to proceed.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated:
Taking into account all of the indicia of bizarre
notions demonstrated before trial started, there was
enough evidence in this case to put the district court
on notice that Hawkins' competence was in question.
Even if the pretrial conduct was insufficient to call for
a competency evaluation,
certainly Hawkins'
testimony during the trial presented compelling indicia
that he was not in touch with reality. When taking the
entire record into account, the district court should
have entertained a reasonable doubt about Hawkins'
mental competency either to stand trial or to
represent himself.
Therefore, the district court's
failure to sua sponte order a mental evaluation and
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency
was an abuse of discretion.
Because it is not possible to retroactively make
a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the
time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of
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conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if
he is found to be competent to stand trial.

State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 782-83, 229 P.3d 379, 387-88
(Ct. App. 2009).
On remand, the district court ordered Hawkins to undergo a
competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-211 and 18-212.
Licensed psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and licensed psychiatrist
Dr. Michael Estess evaluated Hawkins and testified that based on
their interactions with him, his responses to testing, and information
regarding his social and institutional history, Hawkins was
competent to stand trial. Dr. Estess was a consulting psychiatrist
for the Ada County Jail and had a clinic there with three masterslevel social workers on staff throughout the two-year period
Hawkins was incarcerated at the Ada County Jail. Dr. Estess
testified that he interacted with Hawkins individually during this time
period on several occasions and also spoke often with social
workers and jail staff who had more frequent contact with him.
Between 2006 and 2008, neither he nor his staff believed that
Hawkins suffered from any mental illness. Dr. Estess testified at
Hawkins' 2010 competency hearing that, based on the documents
he reviewed, the interviews he conducted, and his interactions and
his staff's interactions with Hawkins prior to trial, he believed
Hawkins was "perfectly competent to understand the nature of the
proceedings, to confer with an attorney in his own defense and
understand what was going on" at the time he was tried in January
2008. It is unclear whether the Court of Appeals knew of Dr.
Estess's interactions with Hawkins when it reviewed his appeal
from his 2008 conviction. Based on the totality of the evidence
presented to it, "including admitted exhibits and testimony
presented during the competency hearing," the district court found
that Hawkins was both presently competent to stand trial and had
been competent to stand trial in January 2008. However, the court
found that the law of the case required it to retry the case.
Hawkins, 155 Idaho at 70-71, 305 P.3d at 514-15.
The state sought and received permission to file an interlocutory appeal
from the district court's December 6, 2010 Order Regarding Defendant's
Competence, which granted Hawkins a new trial. (#38532 R., pp.243-52, 27276, 373); Hawkins, 155 Idaho at 71, 305 P.3d at 515.
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On appeal, the state

argued the Court of Appeals' concluding statement in Hawkins' prior appeal that "it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins'
competency at the time he was tried" and "the state [is] free to retry Hawkins if
he is found to be competent to stand trial" - was merely dictum and not law of
the case that prevented the district court from making a retroactive determination
that Hawkins was competent when he was tried in 2008. (#38532 Appellant's
brief, pp.6-16; Appellant's reply brief, pp.10-15); Hawkins, 155 Idaho at 72, 305
P.3d at 516.

The Idaho Supreme Court agreed and held "the language in

Hawkins regarding a retroactive competency determination and the State being
free to retry Hawkins if he is found presently competent, is not the law of the
case." Hawkins, 155 Idaho at 73, 305 P.3d at 517. Concluding that "[n]either
the law of the case doctrine nor I.AR. 38 prevents the district court from making
a retroactive competency determination as to Hawkins in this case," the Court
"reverse[d] the decision of the district court and remand[ed] [the] case for further
proceedings consistent with [the Court's] opinion."

kL. at 75,

305 P.3d at 519.

On remand following the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion, the district court
advised the parties it intended to conduct a new hearing to determine "whether
or not at the time of trial M[r]. Hawkins was competent to proceed." (R., p.24.)
Hawkins indicated he would like to retain private counsel to represent him in the
new competency proceedings, and the court continued the matter to allow
Hawkins that opportunity.

(R.,

pp.24-25.)

Attorney Eric Fredericksen

subsequently filed a notice of appearance on Hawkins' behalf. (R., pp.88-89.)
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On May 29, 2013,

state filed a motion requesting the district court to

take judicial notice of all prior proceedings in the case,
and exhibits presented at the November 12, 2010 competency hearing.

(R.,

pp.26-37.) Based on that testimony and the exhibits, as well as the underlying
court record, the state asked the district court to "adopt its finding from its
December 6, 2010 Order that [Hawkins] was retroactively competent to stand
trial in January 2008." (R., p.29.) Alternatively, the state requested that, if the
court granted Hawkins a new retroactive competency hearing, it "hold its
December 6, 2010 finding, by clear and convincing evidence[,] that [Hawkins]
was retroactively competent to stand trial in January 2008, [was] sufficient to shift
the burden to [Hawkins] to refute that finding." (R., pp.29-30, 36.)
The district court held a status conference on May 29, 2013, at which
attorney Eric Fredericksen appeared on Hawkins' behalf. (See generally 5/29/13
Tr.) During the status conference, the district court granted the state's request to
take judicial notice of the prior proceedings, including the prior testimony of Dr.
Estess and Dr. Sombke; advised the parties it would conduct a retroactive
competency hearing but would apply a presumption, based on the evidence
already presented at the November 12, 2010 competency hearing, that Hawkins
was competent when he was tried in January 2008; and explained that Hawkins
would be permitted the opportunity to rebut that presumption, including by
subpoenaing and cross-examining Dr. Estess and by presenting his own expert
or fact witnesses.

(5/29/13 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.7, L.25, p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.18.)
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The court set the matter for a retroactive competency hearing on August 29,
2013. (5/29/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.20-22.)
On June 6, 2013, Hawkins, through his retained counsel, filed a motion to
declare himself a "needy person" for the purpose of obtaining funds to secure a
psychological expert to evaluate him and testify on his behalf at the retroactive
competency hearing. (R., pp.93-96; see also 6/17/13 Tr., p.128, L.19 - p.129,
L.11.)

The district court granted the motion, set the matter for a status

conference on July 3, 2013, and instructed Hawkins' counsel to "direct any
specific requests for services to [the] Court for prior approval." (R., p.99; see
also6/17/13Tr., p.129, L.12-p.131, L.16.)
On June 28, 2013, Hawkins' attorney filed a Motion To Withdraw As
Counsel Of Record and an affidavit in support thereof, asserting as one of the
bases for the motion that "[f]or reasons your affiant cannot disclose, Mr. Hawkins
desires to move forward in this case without the representation of your affiant."
(R., pp.101-05.) At the July 3, 2013 status conference, Hawkins confirmed his

"desire to move forward

in [the] case without Mr.

Frederickson's [sic]

representation," and he informed the court he would like to "proceed pro se."
(7/3/13 Tr., p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.4.)

The court expressed reluctance to grant

Hawkins' request to represent himself, explaining:
That kind of presents a conundrum for the court, or a
conflict, because the focus of this hearing is that the argument that
was presented by your attorneys in the appeal before the Court of
Appeals that you were not competent to essentially stand for trial
back in January of 2007 [sic], I believe in your - when your jury trial
was held, okay?
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And so that raises a question about your competency then,
your competency since then, and your competency now, and so if
someone is saying that they aren't competent, you can understand
when they want to represent themselves that creates a real conflict
in the court's way of looking at this thing.
(7/3/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-19.) The court advised Hawkins that he had the right to
have an attorney appointed at public expense (7/3/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-22). The
court also advised Hawkins that, if he so desired, the court would appoint the
public defender's office to represent him, either as primary counsel or as standby
counsel.

(7/3/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-24.)

Hawkins insisted that he wished to

represent himself. (7/3/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-24.)
Faced with Hawkins' request to proceed pro se, the district court engaged
Hawkins in an extensive Faretta 1 inquiry. (7/3/13 Tr., p.12, L.25- p.28, L.8.) At
the outset of that inquiry, the court asked Hawkins whether he was "under the
care of any psychiatrist at [that] point in time," and whether he was "taking any
sort of medications for any mental disease, defect, or malady." (7/3/13 Tr., p.13,
Ls.3-7, 9-11.) Hawkins responded, "No" to both questions. (7/3/13 Tr., p.13,
Ls.8, 12.) The court then explained to Hawkins, in detail, the potential risks and
disadvantages of representing himself, all of which Hawkins stated he
understood. (7/3/13 Tr., p.13, L.13 - p.17, L.13.) The court repeatedly asked
Hawkins why, with all the risks and disadvantages he faced, he wished to
represent himself. (7/3/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-22, p.19, Ls.1-11, p.22, L.2 - p.23,
L.5, p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.6, p.25, Ls.1-6, p.26, Ls.4-8.)

Hawkins responded,

variously, "I believe that the court and prosecution considers me competent, and

1

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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I also know I'm entitled to represent myself" (7/3/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-8); "I believe
it's

best decision for me, for my defense" (7 /3/13

Ls. 7-8); "[T]his

court has found me competent, prosecution believes me competent, this court
has said they have made observations as to my competence, and with that, then
I have a clear constitutional right to represent myself" (7/3/13 Tr., p.25, Ls.8-12);
and "It's my constitutional right" (7/3/13 Tr., p.26, Ls.9-10). The court stated it
"[did not] disagree" with Hawkins' assertion that the court and prosecution
considered him competent, but it also advised Hawkins it was "prepared to hear
evidence as to [his] lack of competency and prepared to rule that way if, in fact,
the weight of the evidence" ultimately showed he was not competent at the time
he was tried. (7/3/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.9-18.) Hawkins indicated he understood and,
in response to further questioning by the court, continued to insist that he be
permitted to represent himself.

(7/3/13 Tr., p.23, L.19 - p.27, L.2.) The court

ultimately granted Hawkins' request, allowed Mr. Fredericksen to withdraw, and
appointed the public defender's office as standby counsel. (7/3/13 Tr., p.27, L.3
- p.28, L.8; R., pp.169-70, 177-78; see also R., p.213 (unsigned written waiver of
right to an attorney; 7/17/13 Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.17, L.12 (district court provided
Hawkins with written waiver form, read it to him, and found, based on Hawkins'
responses to questioning, that Hawkins' "waiver of counsel [was] knowingly,
intelligently, [and] voluntarily made").)
After his attorney was permitted to withdraw, Hawkins filed a number of
pro se motions. (R., pp.107-59.) The district court acknowledged the filings at
status conference on July 17, 2013, but deferred ruling on them pending its final
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determination of whether Hawkins was competent to stand trial in January 2008.
(7/17/13

, p.17,

13 - p.22, L.5.) The court inquired of Hawkins whether he

had subpoenaed Dr. Estess for the August 29

th

competency hearing and

whether he had subpoenaed and/or met with his own psychiatric expert.
(7/17/13 Tr., p.22, L.5 - p.23, L.15.) Hawkins indicated he understood he was
required to subpoena witnesses but he had not done so, and had not met with
his chosen psychiatric expert, Dr. Robert Cloninger, because he had not
received what he believed to be necessary discovery. (7/17/13 Tr., p.22, L.5 p.24, L.5.) The court ordered Hawkins' former attorney to provide Hawkins with
copies of all discovery in his possession (7/17/13 Tr., p.26, L.13- p.27, L.17; R.,
pp.179-80), but it cautioned Hawkins that "discovery [was] not the critical issue"
and would not be a basis to continue the August 29

th

competency hearing

(7/17/13 Tr., p.28, L.15 - p.31, L.9).
At a July 31, 2013 status conference, Hawkins advised the court he had
communicated by e-mail with his chosen psychiatric expert, Dr. Cloninger, but he
had not yet been evaluated because Dr. Cloninger was "awaiting verification of
payment."

(7/31/13 Tr., p.134, L.21 - p.136, L.21.)

Upon further inquiry,

Hawkins advised the court that Dr. Cloninger resided in St. Louis, Missouri, that
his rate was $450 per hour and that, in the event he was required to appear in
person to testify at the competency hearing, he would require additional
compensation for airfare and lodging.

(7/31/13 Tr., p.137, L.6 - p.138, L.8.)

Finding the costs associated with retaining Dr. Cloninger were not reasonable,
the court vacated the August 29

th

competency hearing and instructed Hawkins'
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standby counsel to assist Hawkins in retaining a qualified psychiatrist within a
500-mile radius of Boise, Idaho. (7/31/13 Tr., p.141, L.5 - p.142, L.16.)

The

court subsequently amended its order to require Hawkins to retain a qualified
psychologist or psychiatrist who practiced within the Boise, Nampa, Caldwell or
Twin Falls areas. (R., pp.230-31.) The court's written order further provided that
Hawkins was to disclose the name of his expert by August 29, 2013, and was to
submit to an examination by his expert within 30 days from the date of
disclosure; failure to do either could result in Hawkins being precluded from
presenting expert testimony at the retroactive competency hearing. 2 (R., p.231.)
Hawkins attempted to appeal from the court's order regarding the
selection of his expert witness, but the appeal was dismissed.

(R., p.261;

10/17/13 Tr., p.4, Ls.12-19.) Following the dismissal, the court set a hearing for
October 17, 2013, the purpose of which was "to select a psychologist/psychiatrist
to evaluate the defendant and report to the Court." (R., p.261.) The notice of
hearing also provided: "In the event the defendant does not submit in writing
prior to the hearing his selection of a psychologist/psychiatrist the court then will
make the selection." (R., p.261.)

The court also noted in its written order that Hawkins had "filed numerous
motions many of which are not germane to the sole issue before this court and
that is the competency of the defendant during his jury trial." (R., p.230; see also
R., pp. 187-212, 214-20, 223-27 (Hawkins' prose motions).) The court denied
one of the motions - a motion to strike the testimony of Dr. Estess - but
"suspended" the remaining motions pending the retroactive competency hearing.
(R., p.230.)
2
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It does not appear that Hawkins notified the court in writing before the
1yth hearing regarding his choice of a psychiatric expert. 3
at the October 1J1h hearing who it was that he wished to have evaluate him,
Hawkins responded, "Dr. Robert Collinger [sic]."

(10/17/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-20.)

The court denied that request and, after Hawkins refused to submit the name of
a different expert, indicated it would appoint Dr. Engle to conduct the evaluation.
(10/17/13 Tr., p.5, L.21 - p.6, L.24.) Hawkins advised the court he would not
submit to an evaluation by Dr. Engle and, after consulting with standby counsel,
requested

a seven-day continuance to "possibly" have standby counsel

appointed as counsel of record. (10/17/13 Tr., p.6, L.25- p.10, L.15.) The court
denied the request for a continuance but gave Hawkins additional time to confer
with standby counsel and determine whether he wished to be represented.
(10/17/13 Tr., p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.14.)

Before recessing, the court gave

Hawkins three options:
[l]f Mr. Cahill is going to be your counsel, I'll give him an opportunity
to go out in the community, find a psychiatrist or psychologist and
testify on your behalf. And that's not going to be revokable [sic] on
your part. He is going to be your counsel.
Or Option 2, is that you submit to Dr. Engle's evaluation ....
Or Option 3, if you decline to submit to an evaluation by Dr.
Engle, the court then will sentence you here forthwith today. Those
are your three options.
(10/17/13Tr., p.11, L.15-p.12, L.6.)

3

In a document entitled "Notice of Defenses Psychiatrist[;] Motion for Payment to
Psychiatrist," Hawkins identified Dr. Cloninger as his chosen psychiatric expert.
(R., pp.271-74.) It appears Hawkins signed and mailed the notice on October
11, 2013 (R., pp.273-74), but it was not filed with the court until October 21, 2013
(R., p.271).
10

At the conclusion of the recess, Hawkins indicated he would like standby
counsel to represent him, but also suggested his parents may

able to

privately retain Dr. Cloninger. (10/17/13 Tr., p.12, L.15 - p.14, L.6.) The court
advised Hawkins it would be "an entirely different matter" if he could privately
retain Dr. Cloninger but, until the court had "appropriate documentation, including
financial commitments from [Hawkins'] parents," the court was "not going to
proceed down that path." (10/17/13 Tr., p.13, Ls.9-18.) The court also advised
Hawkins that, if he wanted standby counsel to represent him, standby counsel
would be his lawyer and would "take whatever steps [were] necessary to obtain
an evaluation of [Hawkins] to determine whether or not [he] [was] competent
during [his] jury trial," and Hawkins would not be permitted to "fire him."
(10/17/13 Tr., p.14, L.7 - p.15, L.1.) After again being advised that his choices
were to unconditionally accept counsel's representation, or submit to an
evaluation by Dr. Engle, or be sentenced forthwith, Hawkins told the court, "Then
you should just sentence me today, then. That's what you should do." (10/17/13
Tr., p.15, Ls.2-19.)
After ascertaining from standby counsel that counsel "did not have any
trouble" communicating with Hawkins during the "brief discussions" counsel had
had with him (10/17/13 Tr., p.15, L.20 - p.16, L.23), and after ascertaining from
Hawkins himself that he was not taking psychotropic medications (10/17/13 Tr.,
p.16, L.24 - p.17, L.17), the court made the following findings:
[T]he court will find from the totality of the record that Mr. Hawkins,
particularly in light of the extensive motions that he has filed since
this was submitted back to the court in April of this year - that Mr.
Hawkins is competent, and he understands the nature of the
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proceeding, that he has made a decision, and I find him to have
made a knowing and intelligent decision to continue to insist that a
psychiatrist from St. Louis, Missouri, be appointed to testify on his
behalf for his articulated basis for not appointing that psychiatrist,
that there have been numerous delays caused as a result of again
Mr. Hawkins['] - failure to follow through with the court's specific
order. The court will find that there has been ample opportunity
afforded to Mr. Hawkins to present evidence to the court regarding
his mental status at his trial in 2007 [sic].
The court will find that the testimony and evidence
presented to the court by Dr. Estess that Mr. Hawkins was
competent to stand trial, that he was at the time of his evaluation by
both Dr. Sombke and Dr. Estess was capable of understanding the
proceedings, assisting in his defense, and that that remains the
case today.
(10/17/13 Tr., p.18, L.16-p.19, L.20 (Hawkins' interjections omitted).) The court
therefore reimposed the judgment and Hawkins' unified sentence of life with 30
years fixed. (10/17/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-6, 8-12; R., pp.280-84.)
Hawkins timely appealed from the amended judgment. (R., pp.285-94.)
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ISSUES
Hawkins states the issues on appeal as:
A.
Did the 2010 retroactive determination that Mr. Hawkins was
competent in January of 2008 violate due process?

B.
In the alternative, should this case be remanded for a
determination of whether, given the Supreme Court decision in
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), Mr. Hawkins was
competent to waive his right to counsel?
(Appellant's brief, p.18.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Hawkins failed to show error in the district court's retroactive
competency determination?
2.
Has Hawkins failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
allowing him to exercise his constitutional right to self-representation?

13

ISSUES
states

issues on appeal as:

A

Did the 2010 retroactive determination that Mr. Hawkins was
competent in January of 2008 violate due process?

B.
In the alternative, should this case be remanded for a
determination of whether, given the Supreme Court decision in
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 165 (2008), Mr. Hawkins was
competent to waive his right to counsel?
(Appellant's brief, p.18.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Hawkins failed to show error in the district court's retroactive
competency determination?
2.
Has Hawkins failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
allowing him to exercise his constitutional right to self-representation?

13

ARGUMENT
I.
Hawkins Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Retroactive
Determination That Hawkins Was Competent When He Was Tried In 2008

A.

Introduction
On remand following the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in State v.

Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 229 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2009), the district court ordered
Hawkins to undergo a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-211 and 18212. (#38532 R., pp.29-30, 34-36, 39.) Hawkins was evaluated by two different
mental health professionals, licensed psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and
licensed psychiatrist Dr. Michael Estess. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.9, L.14- p.12,
L.15, p.59, L.22 - p.60, L.18, p.67, L.18 - p.68, L.19; #38532 State's Exhibits 5
and 6.) At an evidentiary hearing on the competency issue, both doctors opined,
based on their interactions with Hawkins, his responses to testing, and other
collateral information regarding Hawkins' social and institutional history, that
Hawkins was presently competent to stand trial. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.16, L.6
- p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2 - p.54, L.2, p.68, L.20 - p.95, L.3.)

Specifically, Dr.

Sombke testified that Hawkins was neither delusional nor psychotic; he was
competent, understood the proceedings against him and was capable of
assisting in his own defense. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.28, L.16-p.46, L.5, p.53,
L.2 - p.56, L.13.)

Dr. Estess likewise testified that Hawkins was "perfectly

competent" to stand trial, that "he [was] not psychotic and not delusional," and
that there was "nothing about him ... that would preclude his ability to confer with
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his attorney in his own defense or to understand the nature and circumstances of
legal difficulties." (#38532 11/12/10

Dr.

, p.91, L.24 - p.95, L.3.)

testified that he and his staff had numerous prior

contacts with Hawkins during the two-year period he was housed in the Ada
County Jail pending his trial in 2008.
L.25.)

(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63,

Between 2006 and 2008, neither Dr. Estess, his staff, nor jail staff

believed that Hawkins suffered from any mental illness. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr.,
p.64, L.14 - p.67, L.17.)

Dr. Estess characterized Hawkins as "arrogant[,]

narcissi[stic], paranoid, inadequate, dependent, dishonest, antisocial ... angry,
petulant, manipulative, deceitful, and dishonest, and coy." (#38532 11/12/10 Tr.,
p.65, Ls.16-22.) He opined, however, that at the time he was tried in January
2008, Hawkins "was perfectly competent to understand the nature of the
proceedings, to confer with an attorney in his own defense and understand what
was going on.

. .. [B]asically, ... he was competent to stand trial."

(#38532

11/12/10 Tr., p.99, L.18-p.100, L.19.)
Based on the totality of the evidence presented to it, "including the
admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing," the
district court found in its December 6, 2010 Order Regarding Defendant's
Competence that Hawkins "is able to assist in his own defense and is capable of
understanding [the] nature of the proceedings" and was therefore presently
competent to stand trial. (#38532 R., p.135.) The court also found by clear and
convincing evidence that Hawkins "understood the nature of the proceedings
against him and was able to assist in his own defense at the time he went to trial
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in this case in January 2008" and, thus, made the retroactive finding that
Hawkins was competent during the 2008 trial.

(#38532 R., pp.135-36.) The

court subsequently adopted that finding in the proceedings that occurred on
remand following the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Hawkins, 155
Idaho 69, 305 P.3d 513 (2013). (5/29/13 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.7, L.25, p.10, L.20 p.11, L.18; 10/17/13 Tr., p.19, Ls.14-20.)
On appeal, Hawkins argues that "the district court erred in determining in
2010 that [he] was retrospectively competent throughout his trial in January of
2008."

(Appellant's

brief,

p.18

(capitalization

altered,

italics omitted).)

Specifically, he asks this Court to find, as a matter of first impression in Idaho,
that retrospective competency determinations made more than one year after
trial do not comport with due process and are therefore impermissible as a
matter of law.

(Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) Alternatively, he contends that a

retroactive determination of his competency to stand trial in 2008 is not possible
"based on the circumstance[s] and facts presented in his case."
brief, p.20.)

(Appellant's

Neither argument withstands scrutiny when viewed in light of the

weight of relevant authority and the facts of this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
"[C]onstitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court

exercises free review." Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _ , 321 P.3d 709, 714
(2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A trial court's determination
that a defendant was competent to stand trial will not be disturbed on appeal if
supported by substantial, competent evidence. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,
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63, 90 P.3d 278, 288 (2003) (citing State v. Daniel, 127 Idaho 801, 803, 907
P.2d 119, 121 (Ct App. 1995); State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967, 970,

2 P.2d

668, 671 (Ct. App. 1985)).

C.

This Court Should Decline To Adopt A Bright-Line Rule That
Retrospective Competency Determinations, Made More Than One Year
After The Defendant Was Tried, Are Per Se Impermissible
Due process prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not

mentally competent to stand trial.

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169-70

(2008). Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375, 385 (1966); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62, 90 P.3d 278, 287
(2003).

Under a due process analysis, the test for determining competency is

whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Accord Edwards, 554 U.S. at 170; Drape,
420 U.S. at 172; Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62, 90 P.3d at 287; State v. Powers, 96
Idaho 833, 843, 537 P.2d 1369, 1379 (1975). In Idaho, the right of a defendant
to be free from prosecution while mentally incompetent is safeguarded by I.C. §§
18-21 O and 18-211 which, together, require the trial court to order a competency
evaluation whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's "capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense."
"[T]he failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's
right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of
his due process right to a fair trial." Drape, 362 U.S. at 172 (citing Pate, 383 U.S.
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375).

If such a violation occurs, the question becomes whether an adequate

hearing can be held

trial.

determine the defendant's competency at the time of his

Drape, 362 U.S. at 183; Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 630 (5

th

Cir.

1986).
Idaho's appellate courts have never considered whether retrospective
competency determinations are permissible.

However, as recognized by the

Idaho Supreme Court, "retroactive competency determinations are allowed in
many jurisdictions under certain circumstances." State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho
69, 73, 305 P.3d 513, 517 (2013) (and cases cited therein). Indeed, numerous
other courts that have considered the issue have held that such determinations
"are permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate
retrospectively the competency of the defendant." Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d
690, 696 (9

th

Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), superseded QY statute on other
th

grounds as stated in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9 Cir. 2000); see also
United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242, 1250 n.3 (9

th

Cir. 2011) (quoting Odle

v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9 th Cir. 2001) (trial court's failure to hold a
competency hearing at the time of trial can be cured by holding a retrospective
competency hearing "when the record contains sufficient information upon which
to base a reasonable psychiatric judgment")); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d
872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he district court is in the best position to determine
whether it can make a retrospective determination of competency."); United
States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 767-68 (3
Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4

th

rd

Cir. 1987) (same); United States v.

Cir. 1995) (same); Wheat, 793 F.2d at 630 (upholding
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retroactive competency determination where the evidence allowed for a
meaningful retrospective hearing and established defendant's competence
time of trial); Galowski v. Berge, 78 F.3d 1176, 1180-82 (ih Cir. 1996) (same);
Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802 (8 th Cir. 1996) (meaningful retroactive
competency determination possible where "the state of the record, together with
such additional evidence as may be relevant and available, permits an accurate
assessment of the defendant's condition at the time"); Clayton v. Gibson, 199
F.3d 1162, 1168-72 (10 th Cir. 1999) (same); Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282,
1286-87 n.6 (11

th

Cir. 1996) ("nunc pro tune competency hearing [possible], so

long as a reliable inquiry into the defendant's competency can still be made");
accord Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921, 929 (ih Cir. 2013); Blakeney v.
United States, 77 A.3d 328, 349-50 (D.C. 2013); Hooker v. United States, 70
A.3d 1197, 1202 (D.C. 2013); State v. Ashe, 748 S.E.2d 610,615 (N.C. Ct. App.
2013); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406, 409 (Ky. 2001 ), overruled
in part on other grounds .QY Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336 (Ky.
2010); State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 184-85 (Wis. 1986); State v. Sanders,
549 S.E.2d 40, 53-55 (W.Va. 2001); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682,
694 (Pa. 2004); Tate v. State, 896 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Ok. 1995); Montana v.
Bostwick, 988 P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999).
Hawkins

appears

to

recognize

that

retrospective

competency

determinations are permissible in certain circumstances. (See Appellant's brief,
p.20 ("In the rare case where less than a year has passed since the trial, the
determination of whether a retroactive competency hearing is possible could be
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made on a case-by-case basis.").) Nevertheless, he asks this Court to hold that
retroactive competency determinations made more than one year after the
defendant was tried are inadequate, as a matter of law, to satisfy the
requirements of due process.

(Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.)

In support of his

argument, Hawkins relies on Dusky, Pate and Drape, supra, noting that, in each
case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the inherent difficulties
associated with retrospectively determining a defendant's competence and, in
each case, the Court declined to remand for a retrospective competency
determination more than one year after the defendant had been tried.
(Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.)
Hawkins' reliance on Dusky, Pate and Drape for a bright-line rule
prohibiting retrospective competency determinations due the passage of time is
misplaced. None of those cases hold that such determinations are impossible.
In fact, the state is unaware of any case, and Hawkins has cited none, that has
interpreted the Supreme Court's opinions in Dusky, Pate and Drope as holding
that retrospective competency determinations, made more than one year after
the defendant was tried, are impermissible as a matter of law. Rather, as set
forth above, courts that have considered the issue nearly universally hold that,
while such determinations may be difficult, they are permissible when the trial
court has sufficient information to make a reliable determination of the
defendant's competency at the time he or she was tried. See, ~ . Odle, 238
F.3d at 1089-90 (passage of "many years since Odle was convicted" did not
preclude trial court from making retrospective competency determination based
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on "old and new evidence" pertaining directly to Odie's competency at the time
was tried); Wheat, 793 F.2d at 630 (Fifth Circuit, though "acutely aware of the
hazards connected with retrospective competency hearings," nevertheless "has
repeatedly sanctioned nunc pro tune proceedings where there is sufficient data
available to guarantee reliability") (citations omitted); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d
322, 329 (Cal. 2011) (and cases cited therein) ("majority of courts that have
considered this issue agree" that failure to hold a competency hearing at the time
of trial can be cured retroactively).
Whether a trial court can conduct a meaningful and reliable retrospective
competency hearing is best assessed on a case-by-case basis, not as a matter
of law. State v. Snyder, 750 So.2d 832, 855 (La. 1999) (citing Miller v. Dugger,
838 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir. 1988)).

The passage of time since the defendant's

conviction, though relevant, "is not an insurmountable obstacle if sufficient
contemporaneous information is available" and "permits an accurate assessment
of the defendant's condition at the time of the original state proceedings."
Snyder, 750 So.2d at 855 (citing Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802-03 (8 th Cir.
1996)); see also Odle, 238 F.3d at 1089-90.

Factors bearing on whether a

meaningful retrospective competency determination is possible include, but are
not limited to, "the existence of contemporaneous medical evidence, the
recollections of non-experts who had the opportunity to interact with the
defendant during the relevant period, statements by the defendant in the trial
transcript, and the existence of medical records." Snyder, 750 So.2d at 855; see
also McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 962-63 (10 th Cir. 2001) (listing similar
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factors and passage of time as relevant considerations in assessment of whether
retrospective competency determination is possible).

Ultimately, it is the trial

court who is in the best position to determine whether the evidence before it
permits a meaningful retrospective determination of the defendant's competence
to stand trial.

kl (citing

Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 767).

Hawkins asks this Court to adopt a bright-line rule prohibiting retrospective
competency determinations in cases where it has been more than one year
since the defendant was tried, but he has not cited any authority for the
proposition that such determinations are per se impermissible; and, as
demonstrated above, the weight of authority actually suggests the opposite.
Because the question of whether such determinations are possible will
necessarily depend on the facts of each case, this Court should reject Hawkins'
invitation to adopt a bright-line rule and instead hold, consistent with prevailing
authority, that such determinations are permissible whenever the trial court has
sufficient information to make a reliable determination of the defendant's
competency at the time of trial.

D.

Hawkins Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Retrospective
Determination That Hawkins Was Competent To Be Tried In 2008
As an

alternative to his argument that retrospective competency

determinations made more than one year after trial are impermissible as a
matter of law, Hawkins asks this Court to find that such a determination is not
possible based on the facts and circumstances of this case. (Appellant's brief,
pp.20-21.)

In advancing this argument, Hawkins fails to recognize that courts

consider a number of factors in determining whether a retrospective competency
determination is

in

case.

McGregor v. Gibson,

248 F.3d 946, 962-63 (10 th Cir. 2001) (and factors cited therein - including (1)
passage of time, (2) availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, (3)
statements by defendant in trial record, and (4) availability of individuals who
were in position to interact with defendant before and during trial).

With the

exception of the passage of time, Hawkins utterly ignores these factors and the
evidence on remand that supports the district court's retroactive finding that
Hawkins was competent when he was tried in January 2008.
After the Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins' convictions, Hawkins was
evaluated by two mental health experts, both of whom testified at a January
2010 competency hearing that Hawkins was then presently competent to be
tried.

(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2 - p.54, L.2, p.68,

L.20 - p.95, L.3.) Dr. Sombke had originally opined that Hawkins was delusional
(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.19, L.16 - p.20, L.13; #38532 State's Exhibit 6), but he
changed his opinion after reviewing a wealth of collateral information that was
not available to him when he made his initial diagnosis (#38532 11/12/10 Tr.,
p.20, L.14 - p.29, L. 10). Included among that information were letters Hawkins
had written to his parents while in jail, a report on Hawkins' psychological
condition prepared by Dr. Michael Johnston in March 2008, and a 2006
psychological evaluation of Hawkins' wife, Darcy. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.20,
L.14 - p.28, L.15; #38532 State's Exhibits 1, 3, 4.)

After reviewing that

information, all of which was admitted at the November 2010 competency
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hearing, and conferring with Dr. Estess, Dr. Sombke concluded that Hawkins has
"always had" the capacity to understand the proceedings against him (#38532
11/12/10 Tr., p.29, L.11-16), and that "he has the capacity to participate
meaningfully in his defense with an attorney" but "he just choses [sicJ not to do
that" (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.29, L.17 - p.30, L.14). Dr. Sombke explained that,
in his view, the "main issue" he had to decide was whether Hawkins was
delusional.

(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.19-22.)

While Hawkins initially

presented to Dr. Sombke as delusional based on Hawkins' insistence that he
was affiliated with and committed his crimes at the direction of covert
governmental agencies, that portrayal was ultimately not borne out by any of the
collateral information Dr. Sombke reviewed. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.30, L.23 p.32, L.5, p.33, L.2 - p.35, L.5.) Dr. Sombke explained:
[l]f somebody holds a delusion for that fixed and for that period of
time, where he says it's been 20 years or more, that delusion would
permeate his life throughout all segments of his life, where it
wouldn't be just compartmentalized right when he talks in court or
whatever. It would be part of his life.
And reviewing the collateral information from the prison and
the other evaluations I saw, I saw almost no references to the
C.I.A., the D.l.A., or government agencies. It wasn't present in
what Mr. Hawkins was telling other people. So it was just - it was
just not consistent with the true delusional disorder that would have
been in those other conversations.
He changed his story a lot in the other information that I was
- the collateral information. There was a lot of changes about his
stories, with his history, and with his wife, and all that.
And all that information leads me to believe that he's not
delusional. And I think a lot of this stuff are stories that he is just
telling people to try to benefit his current situation.
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(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.31, L.6 -

p.32, L.5.)

Ultimately, Dr. Sombke

characterized Hawkins as manipulative and potentially obsessive-compulsive
(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.32, Ls.6-8, p.34, L.8 - p.35, L.5); but

opined that

Hawkins is neither delusional nor psychotic (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.37, L.4 p.38, L.15) and is competent to stand trial (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.29, Ls.3-10).
Dr. Estess also evaluated Hawkins' competency and, in doing so,
reviewed much of the same collateral information relied on by Dr. Sombke.
(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.67, L.18 - p.72, L.2; #38532 State's Exhibit 5.) Unlike
Dr. Sombke, however, Dr. Estess was already familiar with Hawkins because he
and his staff had numerous prior contacts with Hawkins during the two-year
period he was housed in the Ada County Jail pending his trial in 2008. (#38532
11/12/10 Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63, L.25.) Between 2006 and 2008, Dr. Estess had
many discussions with his staff and the jail security officers about Hawkins'
mental condition. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.63, Ls.19-25.) Dr. Estess prescribed
Prozac to Hawkins for depression, but Hawkins did not require any other mental
health treatment, and neither Dr. Estess nor his staff nor jail staff believed that
Hawkins suffered from any mental illness at the time.

(#38532 11/12/10 Tr.,

p.64, L.1 - p.65, L.4, p.67, Ls.6-12.) Dr. Estess characterized Hawkins as "a
very arrogant narcissi, paranoid, inadequate, dependent, dishonest, antisocial
character.

And an angry, petulant, manipulative, deceitful, and dishonest and

coy - thinks more of his intelligence than he has, and presents himself in that
smart-aleck kind of sarcastic, pseudo fashion."

(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.65,

Ls.16-22; see also p.67, Ls.6-10 ("[E]veryone came to the conclusion about
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when they interacted with Mr. Hawkins is that he was a manipulative, dishonest,
obsessive-compulsive, paranoid character who was not mentally ill.").)
on his prior interactions with Hawkins and his comprehensive review of other
information bearing on Hawkins' competency - including the trial transcripts and
information pertaining to Hawkins' prior social, institutional and mental health
history (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.70, L.5 - p.72, L2, p.74, L.8 - p.75, L.21) - Dr.
Estess opined "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that Hawkins was
not only presently competent at the time of the November 2010 competency
hearing (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.91, L.24- p.92, L19), but he was also "perfectly
competent" when he stood trial in January 2008 (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.99, L.18
-p.100, L.13).
Based on the totality of the evidence presented to it, "including the
admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing," the
district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Hawkins "understood
the nature of the proceedings against him and was able to assist in his own
defense at the time he went to trial in this case in January 2008" and, thus, made
the retroactive finding that Hawkins was competent during the 2008 trial.
(#38532 R., pp.135-36.) Hawkins does not directly challenge the district court's
finding, or any of the evidence on which it was based, but instead argues only
that the passage of 34 months between his trial and the district court's
retrospective competency determination "is too long per se for a retrospective
competence evaluation, especially considering the fluid nature of mental illness."
(Appellant's brief, p.21.) Hawkins' argument is just a reiteration of his claim that,

26

because retroactive competency determinations made more than one year after
a defendant

tried are difficult, such determinations are impermissible.

(Compare Respondent's brief, pp.19-20

pp.20-21.) This argument fails for

the reasons already set forth in Section I.C., supra, and Hawkins has otherwise
failed to show any error by the district court.
As previously explained, the passage of time since a defendant's
conviction "is not an insurmountable obstacle" to a retrospective competency
determination so long as "sufficient contemporaneous information is available" to
permit an reliable assessment of the defendant's mental condition at the time of
trial. State v. Snyder, 750 So.2d 832, 855 (La. 1999) (citing Reynolds v. Norris,
86 F.3d 796, 802-03 (8 th Cir. 1996)); see also Odle, 238 F.3d at 1089-90. The
information available to the district court in this case included contemporaneous
medical evidence - including a March 2008 psychological evaluation (#38532
State's Exhibit 3) - the trial transcript, and the observations and opinions of two
mental health experts, one of whom personally interacted and supervised others
who personally interacted with Hawkins before and during his 2008 trial. See,
~ ' McGregor, 248 F.3d at 962-63 (factors to be considered in retrospective
competency determination include availability of contemporaneous medical
evidence, statements by defendant in trial record, and availability of individuals
who were in position to interact with defendant before and during trial). It should
also be noted that the district judge who made the retrospective competency
determination is the same judge who presided over Hawkins' trial and who
observed then that it had never had cause to believe that Hawkins lacked the

mental capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his own defense.
(#35281 Trial Tr., p.1120, L.15- p.1121, L.2.) Taken together, this information
was sufficient to support the district court's retroactive determination that
Hawkins was mentally competent during his 2008 trial.

Hawkins has failed to

show error in the district court's retrospective competency determination.

II.
Hawkins Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Allowing Him To Exercise His Constitutional Right To Self-Representation
A.

Introduction
Hawkins was represented by counsel and had the opportunity to cross-

examine the state's witnesses and present his own evidence at the November
12,

2010

competency

hearing.

(See

generally #38532

11/12/10 Tr.)

Nevertheless, on remand from the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion that held the
law of the case doctrine did not prevent the district court from making a
retroactive competency determination, the district court scheduled a second
competency hearing so that Hawkins would have yet another opportunity to
cross-examine the state's witnesses and present his own psychiatric expert.
(5/29/13 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.7, L.25, p.9, Ls.20-22, p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.18.)
Hawkins initially retained counsel to represent him in the retroactive competency
proceedings 4 (R., pp.88-89), but he later fired counsel and insisted on
proceeding pro se (R., pp.101-05; see generally 7/3/13 Tr.).

4

Following an

As used from this point forward in the state's briefing, the phrase "retroactive
competency proceedings" refers, generally, to the proceedings on remand
following the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69,
305 P.3d 513 (2013).
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extensive Faretta inquiry, during which the court indicated a belief that Hawkins
was mentally competent (7/3/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-9), the court found
"waiver of counsel [was] knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made" and
therefore granted Hawkins' request to proceed prose (7/3/13 Tr., p.10, L.1 p.28, L.8; 7/17/13 Tr., p.13, L.21-p.17, L.12).
Despite having insisted below that he had a constitutional right to
represent himself in the retroactive competency proceedings, Hawkins now
argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by permitting him to
exercise that right.

(Appellant's brief, pp.22-25.)

Specifically, he argues the

court reached its decision without considering whether he was mentally
competent to waive his right to counsel as contemplated by Indiana v. Edwards,
554 U.S. 164 (2008).

Hawkins' argument fails because it is premised on a

misunderstanding of both the law and the facts of this case. Correct application
of the law to the facts shows no abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the

appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
lower court acted within the bounds of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the
lower reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Ruperd, 146 Idaho
742, 743, 202 P.3d 1228, 1289 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115
Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Allowing Hawkins To
Exercise His Constitutional Right To Represent Himself During The
Retroactive Competency Proceedings
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

section 13, of the Idaho Constitution both guarantee criminal defendants the right
to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975); State v.
Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 339, 256 P.3d 735, 747 (2011); State v. Averett, 142 Idaho
879, 885, 136 P.3d 350, 356 (Ct. App. 2006). The right of self-representation,
however, is not absolute. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth App.
Dist., 528 U.S. 142, 161-62 (2000); State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 725, 277, 61 P.3d
632, 634 (Ct. App. 2002). "Because the right to counsel is also guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment, . . . a defendant may waive the right to counsel and
proceed at trial pro se 'only if the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary."'
United States v. DeShazer, 554 F.3d 1281 (10

th

Cir. 2009) (citation omitted);

accord Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 865, 781
P.2d 197, 202 (1989); Averett, 142 Idaho at 885, 136 P.3d at 356. In addition,
the United States Supreme Court recently held in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S.
164,

177-78 (2008),

that when dealing with defendants whose mental

competency is in question, "the Constitution permits States to insist upon
representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky
[v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)] but who still suffer from severe mental

illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by
themselves."

Edwards did not adopt a specific standard for measuring a
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defendant's ability to carry out the basic tasks necessary for self-representation
but recognized instead that the trial judge "will often prove best

to make

more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized
circumstances of a particular defendant." Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177-78.
On appeal, Hawkins does not challenge the district court's finding that he
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel, as required by
Faretta.

Nor does he argue that, at the time of the retroactive competency

proceedings, he lacked the requisite mental capacity under Dusky to understand
the proceedings and assist in his defense. Rather, Hawkins argues the district
court should not have permitted him to exercise his constitutional right to
represent himself in the retroactive competency proceedings without first
considering Edwards and making a specific finding that he was not only
competent under the Dusky standard, but was also competent to carry out the
basic tasks necessary to conduct his own defense. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-25.)
Hawkins apparently believes that, because Edwards was not decided until June
2008 - five months after his January 2008 jury trial - "it never occurred to the
trial court that there might be a standard other than Faretta to apply to Mr.
Hawkins's request to proceed pro se" in the 2013 retroactive competency
proceedings.

(Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.)

He also appears to contend that

Edwards actually mandates a higher standard of competency for those who
represent themselves than for those who are represented by counsel.
(Appellant's brief, pp.20-25.)

Hawkins' arguments are without factual or legal

merit.
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Unlike the trial court in United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060 (9 th Cir.
2009), relied on by Hawkins, the district court in this case clearly had

benefit

of the Edwards opinion in deciding whether to grant Hawkins' request to proceed
pro se.

That the court did not specifically cite Edwards or make an explicit

finding that Hawkins was competent to carry out the basic tasks necessary to
conduct his own defense before allowing Hawkins to exercise his constitutional
right to self-representation in the retroactive competency proceedings does not
show an abuse of discretion. As even the Ferguson court recognized, "Edwards
does not compel a trial court to deny a defendant the exercise of his or her right
to self-representation; it simply permits a trial court to require representation for a
defendant who lacks mental competency to conduct trial proceedings."
Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1070 n.6 (emphasis original) (citing DeShazer, 554 F.3d
1281, 1290 (10 th Cir. 2009)); see also Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 414
(5

th

Cir. 2013) ("Edwards is permissive," allowing but not requiring the state to

insist on counsel "in the 'exceptional' situation where a defendant is found
competent to stand trial and elects to appear pro se, but is so severely mentally
ill that his self-representation threatens an improper conviction." (footnotes
omitted)); United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 385 (th Cir. 2009) ("The Constitution
may have allowed the trial judge to block [the defendant's] request to go it alone,

but it certainly didn't require it." (emphasis original) (citation omitted)); People v.
Taylor, 220 P.3d 872 (Cal. 2009) ("Edwards did not hold ... that due process
mandates a higher standard of mental competence for self-representation than
for trial with counsel"; rather, it "held only that states may, without running afoul
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of Faretta, impose a higher standard." (emphasis original)). Because it is
undisputed both that Hawkins was competent under the Dusky
participate in the retroactive competency proceedings and that he knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel as required by Faretta, the
district court was not required to conduct any further inquiry before permitting
Hawkins to exercise his right to self-representation.
The reasoning of United States v. Berry, supra, is particularly instructive.
Berry was charged with wire fraud and "insisted on representing himself at trial."
Berry, 565 F.3d at 386. On appeal from his conviction, Berry challenged the trial
court's decision to allow him to proceed pro se. See

~

at 387 ("Berry chose to

represent himself at trial, and now he contends the court should have prohibited
that."). Like Hawkins, Berry argued the trial court believed he "had an 'absolute
right' to represent himself.... so long as he was competent to stand trial."

~

And, like Hawkins, Berry argued that, in light of Edwards, "that view is
constitutionally flawed."

~

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Berry's

argument, reasoning:
The Court's decision in Edwards may help Berry in some
abstract way, but even then not by much. Building on Godinez [v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993)], the Edwards Court took another step
towards limiting the right of self-representation. The Court made it
clear that the right to proceed pro se is anything but absolute.
However, in both Godinez and Edwards the Court talked about
what the Constitution permits - limitation of the self-representation
right in connection with pleading guilty and presenting a trial
defense, respectively - not what it mandates. At some point,
presumably, there must be limits to the limitations. If the option to
represent oneself is to be called a "right," not just a sometimes
privilege, it has to be available in the usual course of things.
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Berry, 565 F.3d at 391 (emphasis original). Ultimately, the court concluded that
"the upshot for

[was]

Constitution

have

the trial

judge to block his request to go it alone, but it certainly didn't require it."

kl

(emphasis original).
The Berry court further reasoned that, even if it "were to read Edwards to
require counsel in certain cases" -

a reading the court characterized as

"dubious" - such requirement would not apply in Berry's case because, by its
terms, the Edwards rule that permits a trial court to limit a defendant's right of
self-representation applies only "when the defendant is suffering from a 'severe
mental illness."' Berry, 565 F.3d at 391. "Because there was no evidence before
the trial court showing that Berry had such an affliction, Edwards was simply off
the table."

kl

The reasoning and result of Berry apply with equal force to the facts of
this case.

Hawkins argues the trial court should not have permitted him to

represent himself during the retrospective competency proceedings without first
considering Edwards and determining whether he was mentally competent to do
so. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-25.) As explained by the court in Berry, however,
nothing in Edwards required the trial court to undertake such an inquiry where it
was not then, and is not now, genuinely disputed that Hawkins otherwise
possessed the mental wherewithal necessary to stand trial under Dusky and that
he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel as required
by Faretta.

Moreover, even if Edwards could
for defendants

interpreted as requiring the
enough

stand trial under

Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are

not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves," Edwards, 554 U.S. at
178, the district court would not have been bound by such requirement in this
case because there was no evidence that Hawkins was severely mentally ill.
This is not a case like Ferguson, supra, where the court repeatedly expressed
concern about the defendant's mental capacity to represent himself but felt
constrained by pre-Edwards precedent to allow the defendant - who was
otherwise competent to stand trial - to proceed prose. See Ferguson, 560 F.3d
at 1062-64.

To the contrary, by the time the court conducted the retroactive

competency proceedings in this case the only evidence before it was that
Hawkins did not suffer from any mental illness. (See generally #38532 11/12/10
Tr.; 5/29/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-25, p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.18.)

Although the court was

prepared to make a contrary finding if the weight of the evidence presented at
new competency hearing supported it, both at the time Hawkins expressed a
desire to represent himself and throughout the remainder of the retroactive
competency proceedings, the court had no misgivings about Hawkins' mental
competence. (7/3/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-18; 10/17/13 Tr., p.19, Ls.14-20.) Thus, for
Hawkins, like Berry, "Edwards was simply off the table." Berry, 565 F.3d at 391.
Hawkins has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The

respectfully requests this Court

judgment of conviction.
DATED this 5th day of October 2014.
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